Creditors still trying to collect debts after bankruptcy

James and Shannon Humphrey filed bankruptcy on October 4, 2010 listing Bank of America as a creditor.  After the bankruptcy was filed, Bank of America, illegally contacted the Humphreys on 38 separate occasions.  Bank of America ignored protests from the Humphreys and their lawyer, telling them they didn't care about the bankruptcy and that phone calls would continue until the Humphreys contacted the bankruptcy department so Bank of America could update its computer system. The Court only penalized Bank of America $10,000 plus attorney's fees for these violations. 
Portfolio Recovery, a debt collector, purchased $1.52 billion of bankruptcy debt in 2011 for 9 cents on the dollar.   In the first quarter of 2012 alone, Portfolio Recovery reported earnings of $79,994,000 in fees collecting on bankruptcy debt.  In 2011, Capital One had to refund $2.35 million for illegally collecting on 15,500 claims already discharged in bankruptcy.  Capital One received $3.55 billion in bailout money from the federal government in 2008. EMC Mortgage -- a company purchased by JP Morgan Chase from Bear Stearns -- has illegally billed debtors in bankruptcy so often that bankruptcy judges have assessed punitive damages against it in four different court cases. Gagliardi v. EMC Mortgage, 290 B.R. 808 (Bankr.D.Colo. 2003); Curtis v. EMC Mortgage, 322 B.R. 470 (Bankr.D.Mass.2005); Castro v. EMC Mortgage, 08-01135 (Bankr.D.N.C. 2008); Harlan v. EMC Mortgage, 402 B.R. 703 (Bankr.W.D.Va.2009).   JP Morgan Chase obtained a bailout of $25 billion.   Despite reliance on the public dole to cure their own financial problems, banks have become more voracious in collecting consumer debt.

Excerpted from article written by Richard Gaudreau of the Huffington Post.

For more information about the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, or, its state law counterpart, the Florida Consumer Collection Practices Act, visit us at:

• Stop Collection Harassment;
or
• Consumer Rights Orlando

The twists and turns of the Colorado River Doctrine

A Property Owners Association (Alaqua) retained a law firm to recover delinquent homeowner association maintenance assessments from plaintiff. The law firm mailed to plaintiff a letter demanding payment of the assessments, interest, and other charges.  The debt remained unpaid so the law firm sued the plaintiff Acosta on behalf of Alaqua in Florida state court to foreclose a lien on Acosta’s property or recover a money judgment (the “State Action”).  Alaqua later replaced the first law firm with James A. Gustino and his law firm to litigate the State Action.

While the State Action was pending against him, Acosta filed suit in federal court alleging that Alaqua, the first law firm and Gustino, violated, among other state and federal statutes, the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act in attempting to collect the assessments.  The defendants filed a motion to dismiss the amended complaint.  In the alternative, the motion asked the court to stay the action pursuant to the Colorado Riverabstention doctrine pending the outcome of the State Action.

The district court granted the motion insofar as it sought dismissal pursuant to theColorado River doctrine and dismissed the case without prejudice.  Acosta appealed and the Court of Appeals framed the issue as having to decide whether the federal and state proceedings were parallel for purposes of the Colorado River abstention doctrine.   The court concluded they were not parallel and reversed the trial court’s dismissal, without prejudice.

The Court first emphasized the virtually unflagging obligation of the federal courts to exercise the jurisdiction given them.  It stated that “The doctrine of abstention . . . is an extraordinary and narrow exception to the duty of a District Court to adjudicate a controversy properly before it.”   Furthermore, the Court stated, that the threshold requirement for application of the Colorado River doctrine is that the federal and state cases be sufficiently parallel.    In other words, whether the cases “involve substantially the same parties and substantially the same issues.”   And, if the federal and state proceedings are not parallel, then, the Court opined, that the Colorado River doctrine should not apply.

On appeal, plaintiff, Acosta, argued that the district court erred by applying theColorado River doctrine because the State Action and his federal suit were not parallel because, the two actions involve different parties because the federal action is against Alaqua’s attorneys, not Alaqua.   He also maintained that the two cases presented different legal issues.

The Court of Appeals stated that the district court’s decision depended on its conclusion that if the State Action were decided against Acosta, he would have no viable claims in federal court.  However, the appellate Court observed that the key to the federal case is not only whether the debt was enforceable but also whether the defendants’ conduct when collecting that debt complied with the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act.   This, according to the reviewing panel, raises some doubt about whether resolution of the State Action would decide the FDCPA issues along with the other federal claims that were brought.  Based on its analysis, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s order dismissing the complaint, without prejudice. 

Acosta v. Gustino, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 11339 (11th Cir. Fla. June 6, 2012)

Failure to list pending FDCPA case in subsequent bankruptcy filing dooms claim

Plaintiff incurred a debt on a Target National Bank credit card which transferred plaintiff’s debt to Defendant for collection.  Plaintiff filed a lawsuit alleging violations of the FDCPA for conduct in collecting this debt.  Approximately 6 months after filing the FDCPA lawsuit, plaintiff filed for bankruptcy using different counsel.  Plaintiff failed to list FDCPA suit as an asset in his bankruptcy Schedule B or otherwise indicate to the court or the trustee that such lawsuit existed.  In the State of Financial Affairs, the form requested plaintiff to List all suits, etc.  to which the debtor is or was a party within one year immediately preceding the filing of the bankruptcy case.  Plaintiff checked “None.”  Additionally, plaintiff did not list defendant as either a secured or unsecured creditor, but did list Target National Bank as a creditor with an unknown credit card claim. Defendant filed its motion for summary judgment on the grounds, among others, that judicial estoppel bars plaintiff from proceeding on his FDCPA.

The U.S. District Court judge granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment on the grounds of judicial estoppels finding that the plaintiff’s actions were a deliberate attempt to deceive the bankruptcy court and manipulate the judicial system to gain an unfair advantage over his creditors, including defendant, which is exactly what judicial estoppel is designed to prevent.

Barker v. Asset Acceptance, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 77315 (D. Kan. June 5, 2012)

Plaintiff sues surety and law firm over bond forfeiture that was set aside

Plaintiff paid a bail bondsman a premium for a bond to bail her son out of jail. At the time she obtained the bond, she signed papers which had the legal effect of holding her responsible for the full amount of the bond, $3,500, if her son failed to appear. Plaintiff’s son failed to appear for his arraignment and he bond was revoked. Thereafter, the Court executed a judgment against plaintiff’s son as principal and National Casualty Corporation as surety for $3,500. However, plaintiff’s son eventually appeared in court and the bond forfeiture judgment was set aside. A law firm and two collection agencies sent correspondence and made telephone calls to the plaintiff claiming that she owed National Casualty Corp. $3,500.00. The law firm later sued the plaintiff on this alleged debt. Plaintiff filed suit against National Casualty, the law firm and the debt collectors for violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act principally because they were trying to collect a debt that, as she alleged, did not exist. The Defendants moved to dismiss on various grounds. The Court, in denying the motions to dismiss the FDCPA claims stated that it was bound to accept as true all of the allegations in the plaintiff’s complaint and that if true, would constitute violations of the FDCPA. In its ruling, the Court stated: “An amount misstated by the debt collector need not be deliberate, reckless, or even negligent to trigger liability – it need only be false. Id. In other words, the FDCPA recognizes a strict liability approach.” Barlow v. Safety Nat’l Cas. Corp., 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 75585 (decided May 30, 2012))

Dunning letter from attorney falls under Fair Debt Collection Practice Act

Before the creditor sends a delinquent account to a collection agency, the creditor can send a dunning notice to a consumer. However, when a lawyer attempts to send a similar communication, according to recent case law, it can be considered an attempt at debt collection under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act.


When Izell and Raven Reese defaulted on a loan obtained from Provident Funding Associates, L.P. after giving the lender their mortgage, the lender's law firm sent a letter looking for the missed payment and threatening to foreclose on the Reeses' home if the sum was not attained, the written opinion of the court explained. The Reeses claimed this was an attempt at a collection and violated the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, though a district court disagreed.


A panel of judges in the Eleventh Circuit court of appeals reversed the district court's ruling. The written opinion of the court cited the fact that the letter sent to the Reeses featured the disclaimer reading "This law firm may be attempting to collect a debt on behalf of the above-referenced lender."


The court said the Reeses were correct in asserting there were misleading representations in violation of Section 807 of the FDCPA. According to the opinion, the couple owed a debt to the company, so asking for repayment essentially made the lawyers debt collectors under the FDCPA.


Lawyers may want to cite this case and take care in the future to abide by the FDCPA when contacting any individual who has the possibility of owing a debt to the attorney's client.


Reese v. Ellis, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 8839 (11th Cir. Ga. May 1, 2012).

Defendant was not a "debt collector" under the FDCPA

Plaintiff secured a line of credit with Defendant to purchase computer equipment.  Thereafter, Plaintiff became delinquent in her payments to Defendant, and Defendant began calling Plaintiff's mobile phone with prerecorded messages regarding the debt.  Plaintiff sent Defendant a letter asking Defendant to cease calling her which was received by Defendant.  Plaintiff asserts that this "letter revoked her consent that she had previously given to the Defendant to place calls to her cellular telephone number."   Plaintiff maintains, however, that Defendant continued to place an additional "forty calls to her cellular phone in less than three weeks.

Defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss the Complaint.  The Court held that Defendant did not qualify as a "debt collector" under the FDCPA.   Creditors who collect in their own name and whose principal business is not debt collection . . . are not subject to the [FDCPA]. . . . Because creditors are generally presumed to restrain their abusive collection practices out of a desire to protect their corporate goodwill, their debt collection activities are not subject to the [FDCPA] unless they collect under a name other than their own.  "Creditors—as opposed to debt collectors—generally are not subject to the FDCPA."   "A 'debt collector' is broadly defined as one who attempts to collect debts 'owed or due or asserted to be owed or due to another.'"   A "creditor," on the other hand, is one who "offers or extends to offer credit creating a debt or to whom a debt is owed."  One cannot be both a "creditor" and a "debt  collector" as defined under the FDCPA because the terms are mutually exclusive.

Motion to Dismiss was granted.

Gager v. Dell Fin. Servs., 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 73752 (M.D. Pa. May 29, 2012).

Fair Credit Billing Act

The Fair Credit Billing Act (FCBA) was passed to protect consumers from unfair billing practices, such as being billed for merchandise that was never received or failure to post credits in a timely manner. It also sets a consumer's responsibility for unauthorized charges or ways to seek clarification of items on a bill.

Anytime you dispute a charge, you are using the provisions of the Fair Credit Billing Act.  It is designed to help consumers when erroneous charges or fees appear in their credit card statement.

In order to use the provisions of this law, you must send a letter to the creditor within 60 days of the first incorrect bill mailing. The creditor must acknowledge your dispute in writing within 30 days of receiving it, and must have settled the matter within two billing cycles of receiving the dispute letter.